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INTRODUCTION
Extraordinary writs have two central functions in the hands of appellate courts. One is to enforce the court's mandate; there is no particular
difficulty with this use of the writs, and no more need be said about it.
The other function is to circumvent the ordinary channels of appellate
review. In this function, writs operate as appeals in all but name. As
this use has become more and more routine, it would be more appropriate
to speak of them as "appeals writs" rather than extraordinary writs. My
assignment is to speak of the experience with appeals writs in criminal
cases in civilian courts, in hopes that some profitable analogies may be
drawn to the system of military justice. The assignment is limited to this
scope because I am entirely innocent of any knowledge about the structure, procedures, or substantive law applied within the military justice
system. As ungracious as it may seem, I must begin by suggesting the
reasons why the analogies are very perilous. The most I can really hope
to do is to suggest the kinds of concerns that must be addressed in
shaping your own writ practice.
The most important factors that control the appellate use of extraordinary writs depend on the full institutional context of the entire court
system involved. The most important part of my talk is the first part,
which addresses the multitude of institutional factors that must be
accounted for. There is no lesson more useful than to learn to reflect
wisely on these factors. As a general proposition, these factors appear to
have led to similar conclusions for both civilian and military courts: in
the ordinary course of events, proceedings should be completed at one
judicial level before review is had in another level. In the civilian courts,
this conclusion is expressed through the "final judgment rule." As to
criminal cases, the final judgment rule provides virtually the only path of
appeal. The second part of my talk will illustrate some of the ways in
which the final judgment rule has been applied and manipulated in
criminal cases. Appeals by defendants and by the government must be
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discussed separately in this setting, because substantially different concerns are reflected in the developed doctrine.
The third and fourth parts of this talk go directly to the use of
extraordinary writs to avoid the limits of appeal jurisdiction. Here the
more general part is perhaps less important-the formal pronouncements
that define the role of the writs are familiar to most of us, and do not
shed much light on the specific questions you are apt to encounter. The
more detailed part is, I hope, more interesting, and is most likely the sort
of discussion that was bargained for in setting this topic for discussion.
Civilian courts have employed writs to control trial court actions in a wide
variety of circumstances, at the behest both of criminal defendants and of
the government. For all of the reasons that will be detailed before we
get there, these specific illustrations cannot be carried over directly to
military practice. Nonetheless they provide a context for testing the
more general suggestions.

I. FINAL JUDGMENT RULE: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT
A truly final judgment is one that marks the completion of all the
events that will occur in a trial court. Nothing more remains to be done,
unless it be execution of a judgment against the defendant.
The advantages that may be gained by deferring appeals until entry of
a truly final judgment are familiar, and can be summarized in short
order. Immediate review of every ruling made by a trial court could not
be tolerated. Repeated interruptions and delays could put the trial
process beyond any reasonable control, even if appeals were taken only
when there was a good faith and reasonable belief that the court was
wrong. The opportunities for less honorable delay and harassment of an
adversary also would not go entirely unexploited. More limited opportunities for interlocutory review would not be so disastrous, but would carry
some part of the same costs. The possible advantages to be set against
these costs arise from the opportunity to correct a wrong ruling. These
advantages, however, are reduced by the prospects that most trial court
rulings are correct; that wrong rulings often are corrected by the trial
court; and that uncorrected wrong rulings will not, in the end, taint the
final judgment.
The price that is paid for a final judgment rule, however, can be high.
An erroneous ruling may taint everything that follows. If appeal must
be delayed until final judgment, it may become necessary to repeat the
entire trial proceeding. The costs of repeating the trial go beyond the
obvious costs of expense and anxiety. The further proceedings will be
held later, and may suffer from lapses of memory, inconsequential
inconsistencies that are blown into exaggerated importance, and actual
loss of evidence. Beyond these defects, the retrial proceedings often will
be affected by lessons learned at the first trial. Trial lawyers well know
that there is nothing attractive about reliving an exciting trial on the
morning after. The problem is more than one of boredom; strategies
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have been revealed and must be revised, opportunities to sustain truth by
impeachment are diminished, and so on.
It is bad enough that erroneous rulings may taint subsequent trial
proceedings. It may be worse that they can have consequences outside
the courtroom. All of the many values protected by a testimonial
privilege, for example, can be destroyed if testimony is erroneously
compelled. A defendant who has been wrongly denied release pending
trial can never have those days of freedom restored.
Beyond the impact on individual cases, loss of the opportunity for
interlocutory review means that some areas of law must develop without
much opportunity for appellate guidance. Questions of discovery, for
example, may confuse and divide trial courts for years without the
guidance and uniformity that appeals could provide.
It would be comforting to be able to conclude that these conflicting
considerations can be reconciled by firm adherence to a rule that allows
appeals only from truly final judgments. Federal civilian courts have
long since discarded any such simple conclusion. In both civil and
criminal cases, opportunities have multiplied for interlocutory review. In
civil cases, the paths of review have evolved through elaborations of the
final judgment rule; perhaps the best known and most general of these is
the "collateral order" rule. In addition, statutes have permitted interlocutory appeal as a matter of right in some designated circumstances, and
have permitted interlocutory appeal as a matter of special permission
from the district court and court of appeals together. Extraordinary
writs have become an increasingly frequent supplement to these appeal
provisions. In criminal cases, similar developments have occurred. The
final judgment rule has been expanded, although in ways somewhat
different from civil cases. A small number of special statutes permit
interlocutory appeal by defendants in narrowly defined circumstances.
Interlocutory appeal is allowed to the government as a means of challenging suppression orders. And the extraordinary writs have again played
an expanding role.
The rules that have come to surround the occasions for appeal in
federal civilian courts are elaborate, and they have been spun into ever
more refined elaborations as the courts confront new problems and
reconsider old problems. A modest number of lawyers actually understand the basic premises built into the rules; many do not. Even those
who understand the basic premises know that it is often difficult to find a
clear answer for a specific question of appealability. This complexity is,
by itself, a substantial reason for wondering whether a different system
of courts-such as the military courts-should seek to borrow much of the
developed doctrine.
Quite apart from these problems of complexity, there are much more
fundamental reasons for caution in seeking to borrow the criminal
appeals doctrine of the federal courts. The most general way of stating
these reasons is to observe that the desirability of departing from the
final judgment rule is controlled by an array of institutional factors that
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are unique to each particular system of courts. Rules that work-if they
do-for federal criminal courts may not be good for military courts.
The institutional factors that must be considered in developing rules for
interlocutory review can be grouped around a deceptively simple set of
poles. It is important to understand the nature of the trial tribunals, the
appeals tribunals, the bar, the procedures of all tribunals, and the
substantive law being applied. If the only path of interlocutory review is
to be by writ practice, as seems to be the case for military courts, all that
need be done is to understand the role of all these factors. Unfortunately, that is no small task.
Let us begin with the nature of trial tribunals. The single most
important factor is the quality of the various persons who collectively
may comprise the first level of court-martial proceedings. The better
they are in discharging their functions, the less need there is to create an
intrusive means of regular interlocutory review. If appellate courts are
willing to allow matters to go to an uninterrupted conclusion at the
court-martial level, moreover, it is likely that these initial tribunals
actually will perform better. Beyond the quality of the judges, account
must be taken of the scope of review. Interlocutory review is less
profitable if there is no more than a slight chance of reversal; a narrow
scope of review obviously suggests that reversal is unlikely. The nature
of trial level procedure also must be considered. Military procedure is no
doubt unique in many ways. If the procedure is well adapted to the
character of the court-martial tribunals, there is less need for interlocutory supervision. Finally, the very nature of the case-load has a bearing on
the desirability of writ review. Interlocutory review is more important
as trial courts become burdened with substantial loads of complex,
lengthy litigation that involves new and uncertain areas of law or
procedure. If the main work of the trial courts involves generally
familiar bodies of substantive and procedural law, there is less need to
worry about interlocutory review. Review on appeal from final disposition is adequate.
The structure and character of the appellate courts are as important to
the calculus as the quality of the trial courts. If there is a two-level
system of appeals courts, the first chore is to determine the primary
responsibility for interlocutory review-whether it should lie first in the
intermediate courts, here the individual service Courts of Military Review, or with the supreme court, here the Court of Military Appeals.
Ordinarily, at least, it makes sense to place primary responsibility with
the intermediate courts. Wherever responsibility is placed, a major
concern must be the capacity of the courts to respond quickly and
constructively. The costs of interlocutory review are reduced in measure
as the appeals court can reach a prompt decision that in fact improves the
course of trial proceedings.
The character of the bar is perhaps more important than we tend to
think. A flexible system of interlocutory review can work very well if
lawyers are well aware of the need to invoke review with restraint. It
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can prove disastrous if it is abused by counsel who seek delay, or misused
by counsel who simply do not know better.
By now it should be apparent that the military courts can look to the
experience of federal criminal courts for no more than illustrations of the
problems that are likely to be encountered. Courts-martial, whether
general, special, or summary, are not structured or staffed in the same
ways as federal district courts. Court-martial procedure is unique in
many ways. The substantive rules applied are apt to be more cohesive
and better known than the incredible array of rules applied in the district
courts. The relationships between the appellate tribunals and the courtsmartial also are different, and the appellate courts themselves are differently composed. The corps of military lawyers may be capable of more
sophisticated use of a flexible appeals system than is the heterogeneous
civilian bar. The procedures that work and do not work for the civilian
courts cannot be adopted or rejected without careful reflection.
In short, all that follows is no more than food for thought. You will
have to develop for the military courts an indigenous, home-grown,
unique system of writ review. You should not disdain the experience of
civilian courts; upon independent examination, it may prove that much of
that experience offers lessons valuable for military courts. At the same
time, you must critically examine the civilian experience against the
background of your own system. With care, you may do better by
yourselves than the civilian courts have done for themselves.
Finally, the military court system must confront a special set of
distinctions that, mercifully, have had little analogue in the civilian
courts. Systems of review that work well in times of peace may be
ill-suited to the special exigencies that arise from combat. The problems
of review presented by courts-martial held in circumstances of combat or
combat-readiness must be resolved on their own. Little or nothing in
contemporary civilian practice can help to illuminate these unique problems.
II. FINAL JUDGMENT VALUES: THE FOUNDATION
OF ANALYSIS

Extraordinary writ practice in federal courts is powerfully influenced
by the premise that very good reason must be found for ignoring the final
judgment rule. In criminal cases, it is common ground that the final
judgment rule is even more important than in civil cases. In order to
approach the writ decisions, then, it is necessary to look first at the
evolution of final judgment doctrine in criminal cases. Appeals by
defendants have followed one path, which will be explored first. Government appeals have been constrained by quite different considerations,
particularly the tortured concepts of double jeopardy, and will be treated
separately.
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A. Defendant Appeals

Discussion of the final judgment rule in criminal cases must begin with
an obligatory citation to Cobbledick v. U.S., 1940, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct.
540, 84 L.Ed. 783. Justice Frankfurter there stated clearly a theme that
has been repeated ever since: the final judgment rule applies in criminal
cases with greater force than in civil cases. The delays and disruptions of
intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the effective and fair
administration of justice. DiBella v. U.S., 1962, 369 U.S. 121, 126, 82 S.Ct.
654, 657, 7 L.Ed.2d 614. This perception has translated into the general
rule that in criminal cases, " 'Final judgment * * * means sentence.· The
sentence is the judgment.'" Parr v. U.S., 1956, 351 U.S. 513, 76 S.Ct. 912,
100 L.Ed. 1377.
There is a clear statutory provision for interlocutory appeals in the Bail
Reform Act of 1966. The desire to provide prompt review of matters that
affect freedom pending trial is easily understandable. Even before
passage of the Act, collateral order appeal was available to challenge at
least some bail determinations on the theory that even before trial, the
consequences of such determinations are so important that they can be
treated as if "final" judgments.
A much more general method of invoking interlocutory review is
through the doctrine just mentioned, the "collateral order" doctrine that
was first clearly articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
1949, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528. This doctrine permits
appeal under the final judgment statute, § 1291, on the theory that a
seemingly interlocutory order has such important consequences that immediate appeal must be afforded. There are three, or perhaps four,
requirements for appeal. Three are commonly summarized in statements
that
the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
The fourth requirement, invoked in some opinions but not others, is that
the order involve a serious and unsettled question of law.
By far the most prominent application of collateral order doctrine to
appeals by criminal defendants is found in Abney v. U.S., 1977, 431 U.S.
651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651. The ordinary rule is that denial of a
defendant's motion to dismiss a prosecution is not a final judgment. In
Abney, the Court ruled that collateral order doctrine permits appeal from
denial of a motion to dismiss that rests on double jeopardy grounds. To
appeal, the defendant must show that the district court has finally
resolved the double jeopardy claim. Once this is shown, the claim is
found to be separable from the issue on the merits, which is guilt of the
offense charged. The most important part of the decision, however, is
the portion that concludes that immediate appeal is necessary to protect
double jeopardy rights. The double jeopardy clause is intended to protect
against the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of trial.
This protection is defeated if appeal must await conviction.
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Two divergent lessons must be noted about experience under the Abney
rule. The first lesson is direct: Abney appeals on double jeopardy
grounds have proliferated. The courts of appeals have had to develop
special procedures to dispatch quickly a substantial number of ill-founded
appeals based on hopeless double jeopardy claims, so as to avoid undue
interference with trial court processes. In extreme cases, it has been
necessary to conclude that a trial court can proceed notwithstanding the
notice of appeal. If a colorable double jeopardy claim is presented, it may
prove impossible to avoid this unhappy experience. Nonetheless, the
Abney doctrine should not be embraced without careful attention to the
ameliorating procedural details that can make it more bearable.
The second lesson from Abney has doubtless been shaped by the first.
The key to this particular theory of collateral order appeal has been found
in the concept that some doctrines are specifically intended to create a
right not to be tried, as with double jeopardy. One illustration that is not
likely to occur in military practice is provided by the rule that the
privileges conferred on members of Congress by the Speech or Debate
Clause are intended to protect against the burdens of trial. Much more
often than not, the conclusion is that appeal is not available. In U.S. v.
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 1982, U.S.~-, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d
754, the Court ruled that denial of a motion to dismiss for vindictive
prosecution is not eligible for collateral order appeal. It held squarely
that appeal is available only if there is "a right not to be tried," and that
it is important to guard against ever-multiplying exceptions that might
swallow up the policy against piecemeal appeal in criminal prosecutions.
Other decisions have ruled that the right to a speedy trial is not to be
protected by collateral order appeal, and have rejected appeals rested on
breach of plea bargaining agreements and statutes of limitations. Collateral order appeals are not apt to be warmly embraced in other settings.
As might be expected, much of the lore surrounding defendant appeals
goes to matters of discovery and suppression. As to discovery, the
ordinary rule is the same as the rule in civil cases: orders that grant or
deny discovery are not appealable. Exceptions ordinarily are denied even
as to claims of privilege, although in extreme cases that pose particularly
important questions of national security or especially sensitive questions
of relations to other branches of government, appeal may be allowed on
collateral order reasoning.
As to pretrial motions to suppress, the courts have concocted a nearly
impenetrable body of doctrine. The leading decision is DiBella v. U.S.,
1962, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614. The central concern is
that care should be taken to guard against interference with a pending
prosecution, in light of the expectation that denial of suppression can be
tested by appeal if a conviction ensues. The complications have developed out of the difficulties that arise when it is clear that there may be a
criminal prosecution, but it is equally clear that there may not. Defendants often have plausible claims to the return of property, and there is no
assurance that an opportunity for appeal ever will arise after denial of
the motion to suppress. The details of the ensuing rules defy easy
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summary; with the hope that military procedure is apt to be more
expeditious than other criminal procedures, they are simply put aside
here.
A wide variety of other pretrial and trial rulings have prompted
attempts to appeal. Among pretrial rulings, particular note may be made
of denials of motions to disqualify opposing counsel. It is now settled
that collateral order doctrine does not permit appeal in civil cases. The
experience of the courts of appeals that had experimented with such
appeals was disastrous. It seems likely that the same rule will be
followed in criminal cases, lest motions to disqualify government counsel
be made with an eye as much to the strategic opportunity for delay by
appeal as to any real need for disqualification.
Some post-trial rulings also are held non-final; the clearest example is
provided by orders granting new trials. Orders entered after completion
of the original criminal proceeding, however, often are appealable because
there is no clear prospect that any later proceedings will occur to afford
an opportunity for appeal. Here too, there is little reason to linger on
possible analogies to military practice.
It may be useful to note one last feature of ordinary criminal practice.
The Supreme Court has just sent to Congress an amendment to Criminal
Rule ll(a)(2) that would confirm the practice of conditional guilty pleas
that had been adopted by a few courts of appeals, even as it was rejected
by others. Under this procedure, a defendant can enter a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere that reserves the right to appeal denial of any
specified pretrial motion. Approval of the court and consent of the
government are required. This procedure promises substantial benefits
to some defendants who are persuaded that there is no reason to endure
the strains and delays of trial on the facts after pretrial disposition of
controlling questions of law or procedure. This procedure seems uniquely
tailored to review by appeal rather than extraordinary writ; if you are to
emulate it, it must be directly.
B. Government Appeals

In the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress drastically amended the provision for government appeals in criminal cases, 18 U .S.C.
§ 3731. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the new statute was
intended to remove all statutory barriers to appeals by the government, a
bit of hyperbole that must be taken with a grain of salt in light of several
well-reasoned decisions that attach final judgment doctrine to some
aspects of the statute.
Two quite different applications of § 3731 must be distinguished. One
part of the statute provides a right of pretrial appeal from orders that
suppress or exclude evidence. Pretrial appeal is necessary in criminal
cases, even though it would be denied in civil cases, because of the
prospect that the government would not be allowed to appeal after a
fact-based acquittal at a trial that was limited by an erroneous exclusion
of evidence. The statute contains built-in safeguards to ensure that
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appeals are taken only if the ruling is important to the prosecution of the
case, and that they are taken promptly so as to avoid delay. This portion
of the statute appears to have worked well; a great many appeals are
decided under it without further discussion of appealability, and without
apparent abuse. This is an area in which it may prove very attractive to
create an extraordinary writ substitute in a military justice system that
has no analogous appeal procedure.
A separate aspect of § 3731 permits appeal from a judgment dismissing
a prosecution, "except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause * * * prohibits further prosecution." This portion of the statute
has generated an extraordinarily confusing body of Supreme Court decisions. It is my understanding that there is no analogous provision for
appeal within the military justice system. The double jeopardy rulings
that have shaped application of the statute may be relevant nonetheless,
since they will control any effort to substitute writ appeals for formal
appeals. Any effort at brief summary is risky; it is all the more risky for
me, since I am uncertain as to the very premises of statute and constitution that have shaped double jeopardy thinking in this area. Nonetheless,
the following summary is offered without further apology.
Two or three themes can be identified in the current decisions that
wrestle with the appeals implications of double jeopardy. The government should not be afforded a second opportunity to convict that might
enable it to supply deficiencies in its case that were revealed by the first
trial; it should not be allowed a chance to persuade a second factfinder,
who might be more favorably inclined than the first; and it should not be
able to wear down defendants whose resources are insufficient to withstand repeated trials.
The decisions that elaborate these concerns into specific rules have
created distinctions that seem artificial or worse. Heavy emphasis has
been placed on an unarticulated concept of "acquittal" that defeats
appeal even though the trial court acted solely on the basis of mistaken
legal theories, and that permits appeal even though the result may be to
require a complete retrial of the case. It is still possible that important
consequences will hang on the verbal formula chosen by the trial court,
whether it be to "dismiss" or to "acquit," even though the underlying
reason for the disposition be the same. The litany of case names could be
extended to great length; the most important are Fitch v. U.S., 1977, 433
U.S. 676, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048; Sanabria v. U.S., 1978, 437 U.S.
54, 91 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43; U.S. v. Scott, 1978, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct.
2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65; Lee v. U.S., 1977, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53
L.Ed.2d 80; and U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 1977, 430 U.S. 564, 97
S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642. Without attempting to summarize the decisions individually, an illustration may help to suggest the directions they
seem to take.
An easy illustration can be drawn around a prosecution for armed
robbery. Before trial, the defendant moves to dismiss for preindictment
delay, and renews the motion twice during trial. At the close of all the
evidence, the motion is granted. The government can appeal, even
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though victory will require a complete new trial. Scott. The Court
explained that in such circumstances there has not been an acquittal
based on determination of the factual elements of the offense charged,
and that by seeking dismissal the defendant has invited the burdens of a
second trial.
Suppose instead the defendant seeks acquittal at the close of trial on
the ground that the government failed to prove that the hammer had
been cocked on the automatic pistol he held during the robbery. If the
trial court rules that the offense requires proof that the hammer was
cocked, and acquits on that ground, the government cannot appeal. It
makes no difference that the trial court was completely wrong in its
belief that such proof is required; it is sufficient that its decision rests on
an evaluation of the factual sufficiency of the case. Sanabria.
Suppose instead that upon the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure
to prove that the hammer was cocked, the district court ruled that the
government had proved an offense other than armed robbery, perhaps
robbery by threat of force, and "dismissed" for failure to charge the
offense proved. The lesson of the Lee case seems to be that this dismissal
is more a "mistrial" than an "acquittal," and that the government can
appeal.
Finally, suppose trial was held to the court without a jury. If the court
simply states an erroneous view of the law and enters a judgment of
acquittal, apparently appeal is foreclosed. But if the court makes detailed findings of fact, states that the defendant is guilty if the law is as
claimed by the government, but concludes that the defendant must be
acquitted for failure to prove that the hammer was cocked, the Fitch case
seems to say that appeal can be taken.
These distinctions do not respond to any obvious sense of purpose. The
easiest explanation may be that trial judges should have broad power to
terminate all proceedings on a given criminal charge, as a matter of
protecting defendants. This explanation would make more sense if it
were translated into an explicit rule that a trial judge has this power,
that it cannot be reviewed, and that it must be exercised by an express
order dismissing with prejudice. As a matter of desirable criminal
procedure, this is at least understandable. As a matter of constitutional
compulsion, drawn from the double jeopardy clause and fixed on state
courts, it is very difficult to understand.
Translation of these concerns into the setting of military justice requires a bit of an effort. There is no appeal procedure for the government analogous to § 3731. Double jeopardy rules are likely to be
encountered, however, if writ practice is pushed even to the limits that
have characterized the federal courts of appeals practices in criminal
cases. If writ practice is pushed further, in an effort to create a
substitute for an appeals statute, the double jeopardy rules must be
reckoned with in a very serious way.
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III. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS: GENERAL RULES
There are so many misleading statements about the general role of the
extraordinary writs that it is best to begin by noting that they must not
be taken seriously. The double jurisdictional characterizations are the
most prominent of the misleading rules. Traditional rules had it that
mandamus was available only to compel action that a lower court lacked
authority to withhold, and that prohibition was available only to prevent
action beyond the court's jurisdiction. The concept of "jurisdiction" in
these cases quickly moved beyond any familiar or useful concepts, and has
degenerated to a point at which it can safely be ignored. More trouble is
caused by the notion that the limits on proper writ practice are jurisdictional, so that obedience to the limits is required even when it would be
more sensible to bend or ignore them. This notion too should be put
aside. If a writ proceeding has carried to a point at which it is better to
resolve the issues presented, they should be resolved; that it might have
been better not to start down that road is no longer controlling. A third
notion is that the writs are not to be used as substitutes for appeals. The
plain fact is that writs are used as an appeals process, and that courts
have benefited from this use.
A. Power
The first and most important limit on writ power is that it can be
exercised only in aid of the court's jurisdiction. This much is required by
the language of§ 1651(a). This limit, however, does not mean much. As
to the federal courts of appeals, it means essentially that a writ cannot
issue to an inferior tribunal if it is clear that the court of appeals could
not ever acquire jurisdiction of an appeal in that particular case. A court
of appeals for one circuit cannot issue a writ to a district court in another
circuit. Potential appellate jurisdiction, however, clearly is enough. It is
not required that an appeal have been taken. Neither is it required that
a writ be the only conceivable means of controlling the district court or
preserving eventual appellate jurisdiction. A writ may be found in aid of
jurisdiction simply because it is more efficient to provide present review
of an order that could effectively be reviewed on a subsequent appeal.
For the federal courts of appeals, the central concepts of power embodied
in the "aid of jurisdiction" notion present very little practical problem
indeed.
I do not know enough of the structure of the military justice system to
guess accurately whether there may be more serious problems of power
presented by the "aid of jurisdiction" limit. The practice of the Supreme
Court makes it clear that a court at the apex of the judicial pyramid can
issue a writ directly to a court at the base, without waiting action by an
intermediate court. Hence it is appropriate for the Court of Military
Appeals to undertake writ control of proceedings in a court-martial
tribunal, and perhaps quasi-judicial officers, without insisting on prior
application to the appropriate Court of Military Review.
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A much more difficult question is presented by the prospect of cases
that never can come before a Court of Military Review or the Court of
Military Appeals. It may be clear from the very inception of a courtmartial proceeding that the case never will fall within these channels of
review. Alternatively, a case may progress from an ambiguous posture
to one in which it has become clear that these courts will not ever have
appellate jurisdiction. There is an obvious argument that in these
circumstances, a writ issued by these courts would not be in aid of any
prospective app.ellate jurisdiction. Perhaps this argument should prevail.
It would be a mistake, however, to accept this conclusion without further
inquiry. There may be important reasons for ensuring effective control
over the proceedings in some of these cases. The courts of the military
justice system have much to contribute both to achieving uniformity of
law and procedure and to ensuring individual justice. The special obligations and abilities of these courts, as courts, must be considered carefully.
If indeed the system can be made to work better by adopting a limited
writ practice in these cases, the opportunity should not be put aside by
any process of analogy to civilian courts. Both the flexible process of
interpretation that has characterized the growth of § 1651 learning in
other areas, and more diffuse notions of "inherent power" drawn from
the particular needs of the military justice system, may be enough. Final
determination of this question must turn on a sophisticated familiarity
with the system and a clear determination whether insuperable obstacles
are raised by the history of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For
me, it is enough to raise the question and to urge that it be resolved as a
matter of the needs of this system of courts, not by analogy to other court
systems.
A second limitation on writ power is found in the frequently repeated
exhortation that the writs are not to be used as substitutes for appeal.
This rule has been noted a few moments ago. It serves the valid function
of reminding us that the final judgment rule has values, and that they
should be taken into account. It cannot obscure the simple fact that writ
practice has become a form of appellate review in all but name. The real
rule is that writs should be used as a form of appeal whenever that makes
good institutional sense.
One possible difficulty with treating the writs as a form of appeal
arises from the procedure. Formally, the writ process is initiated by an
initial application to the court of appeals. The judge of the lower court is
traditionally named as the respondent. The federal courts of appeals,
however, have moved increasingly away from the traditional practices.
Many now have rules that reduce the role of the trial judge to that of
nominal participant in most cases. These rules are very desirable, and
should be adopted generally.

B. Traditional Limits of the Writs
Long enough ago, there were technical limits that defined the respective limits of the various writs used to control-among other things-ju-
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dicial action. Mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus each
had defined roles. Habeas corpus has retained its distinctive identity.
The other writs, however, have come to be used interchangeably-mandamus and prohibition need not be distinguished at all, and if an unusual
case presents a need that formerly would have been filled by certiorari it
is difficult to imagine denial of relief simply because the wrong caption
was used.
Whatever the form, the clearest traditional function of the writs was to
control jurisdictional excesses. The writs were used to confine lower
courts to lawful exercise of their prescribed jurisdiction, or to compel an
exercise of authority that could not lawfully be withheld. Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Assn., 1943, 319 U.S. 21, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed. 1185.
Even within this area, however, it was clearly established that use of the
writs is discretionary. An appellate court is not obliged to make a
thorough and complete determination of the jurisdictional issues raised by
a writ petition; it can deny the petition as a matter of discretion without
deciding whether there is jurisdiction in the lower court. Guidance is
sought in the clarity of the alleged jurisdictional violation and in its
importance. Particularly if later review by appeal seems a sufficient
remedy, writ control may be denied.
For many years, it has been established that the writs can go beyond
"jurisdictional" usurpation or default of lower courts. It is a relatively
easy extension to control a "usurpation of power" even in cases that
otherwise are within a court's jurisdiction. An order sequestering property that the district court had no power to sequester, for example, was
controlled by mandamus in De Beers Consolidated Mines v. U.S., 1945, 325
U.S. 212, 65 S.Ct. 1130, 89 L.Ed. 1566. More recent cases have gone
further, recognizing a power to control "a clear abuse of discretion."
Although it was easily said that the writs "need not run the gauntlet of
reversible errors," it was clear that they had gone beyond any limits of
controlling excesses of lower court jurisdiction.
The discretionary character of writ jurisdiction was reflected in areas
other than the limits of writ "power." Cases involving the timing of the
writ application are the most general and interesting. The writs simply
are not used to control disposition of a matter on which a district court
has not ruled, unless it be to compel the district court to make a ruling
that has been too long delayed. At the other end of the time line, a writ
may be denied because the application was too long delayed.
C. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus

The roots of the greatest modern expansion of writ practice lie in La
Buy v. Howes Leather Company, 1957, 352 U.S. 249, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1
L.Ed.2d 209. A bare two years eariier, Chief Judge Magruder had
protested that § 1651 does not grant "a general roving commission to
supervise the administration of justice." His protest was embraced by
the four justices who dissented in the La Buy case. The majority,
however, chose a different view. The actual ruling was that it was
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proper to use mandamus to set aside reference of complex antitrust
litigation to a master; in part, the decision seemed to rest on the fact that
the same judge had referred several cases to masters, and that other
judges on his court appeared to have used masters too often. The Court
then observed that:
We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the
Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in
the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts of
Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the
exceptional circumstances existing here.
Since the La Buy case, courts of appeals have slowly evolved a practice
known as supervisory or advisory mandamus. Appeals writs are used to
resolve questions that seem important, and likely to avoid timely or
effective determination in the ordinary processes of appeal. These are
the cases that help to solidify the conclusion. The writs have become an
extraordinary appeal process, and one that is not so very far out of the
ordinary at that. The ways in which this function of the writs may
become involved with criminal cases are all that remain to be explored.
IV. WRITS IN CRIMINAL CASES
At last we come to direct discussion of the topic you had expected to be
regaled with. Extraordinary writs are used in criminal cases, both on
petition by defendants and at the request of the government. The
practice has been shaped by the perception that the final judgment rule
has special importance in criminal prosecutions, but it has not been
stunted on this account. It is best to introduce this topic by recounting
the decision in the Will case, before turning to the separate problems
posed by defendant and government petitions.
A. Will v. United States, 1967, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19
L.Ed.2d 305

The Will case is the necessary point of departure for discussing writ
practice in criminal cases. Judge Will had ordered the government to
provide a bill of particulars that would provide substantial information
about witnesses to any statements of the defendant that were relied upon
by the government to support the charge in the indictment. The court of
appeals issued a writ of mandamus to set aside this order, but did not
explain why the order was erroneous, much less why the error was of
such proportion as to warrant mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed.
Even in reversing, however, it observed that it was not deciding whether
mandamus might be appropriate "upon a more complete record, supplemented by the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals." The
fact that the way was left open for ultimate issuance of a writ may be
more important than many of the observations made along the way.
The opening portions of the Will opinion, however, seem to call for very
sparing use of writs in criminal cases. The Court described all of the

ANALOGIES FOR MILITARY COURTS

607

Cite as 98 F.R.D. 593

traditional formulas that limit the extraordinary writs to extraordinary
cases, and emphasized that the general policy against piecemeal appellate
review is even stronger in criminal cases because of the interest in speedy
resolution of the charges. The policies of double jeopardy were found a
further and special limit on the writs.
Turning to the specific circumstances of the case, the Court emphasized
that there was no claim that Judge Will lacked "power" to enter his
order, and no reliance on any wrongful general practice of Judge Will or
other members of his court. Up to this point, the opinion seems to
suggest that very special circumstances are required to support a writ in
a criminal case, at least at the behest of the government.
The concluding paragraphs of the Will opinion then appear to turn in a
different direction. The government argued that mandamus serves "a
vital corrective and didactic function." The Court apparently agreed that
"these aims lay at the core of this Court's decisions in La Buy [ v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290] and Schlagenhauf
[v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152]." It explained,
however, that these purposes could not justify a writ in a case that lacked
any showings or findings to support use of mandamus as a "corrective
measure," and that lacked any opinion that could serve to guide district
courts in the correct directions. The Court concluded as just noted-it
remanded for further proceedings, noting that it was not deciding what
result might be proper on a more complete record and with a supporting
court of appeals decision.
The Will decision, in short, speaks clearly of the caution that should be
used in exerting writ control in criminal cases. Although it is not as
clear, it also seems to recognize that writ control remains appropriate.
Certainly subsequent decisions in the courts of appeals have concluded
that there is ample room for extraordinary writ practice in criminal cases,
and have exercised control through the writs.

B. Defendant Writ Applications
In the wake of the Will decision, several courts have noted that the
Court's special concerns with appellate use of the writs in criminal cases
are much reduced if it is the defendant who applies. The reluctance to
interfere with criminal proceedings by piecemeal appellate review remains, but it is far from controlling.
Writs in fact have issued to review an order to appear in a lineup;
denial of dismissal; revocation of bail; gag orders; refusal to hold a
probable cause hearing; denial of jury trial; limitations on discovery;
and refusal to permit out-state counsel to appear pro hac vice. An order
transferring a defendant from the district of arrest to the district of
indictment has been similarly set aside. Nonparties also may have access
to the writs; the most likely example is shown by cases that permit
newspapers to set aside gag orders by mandamus. It seems probable that
over time, mandamus in these cases will come close to the practice in civil
cases. Some classes of orders will prove particularly susceptible to writ
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control. In civil cases, mandamus has become routinely available to
preserve the right to jury trial; it is not unlikely that in criminal cases, it
will be relatively accessible to control the nature of the trial forum. If
there should be disputes about the composition of a court martial, they
seem particularly likely to be susceptible to mandamus control. Matters
of "discovery" have figured in many civil cases, particularly when there is
a plausible claim that a testimonial privilege requires protection. Criminal and military trial cases seem likely to follow suit. Disqualification of
trial judges has often been reviewed by mandamus in civil cases; so it
may easily come to be in criminal and military cases.
There are few illustrations in criminal cases to parallel the traditional
uses of mandamus to control jurisdiction. Here too, however, there are
particularly strong arguments to be made for mandamus control. The
policies that limit military tribunals to trial of service-connected offenses,
and to jurisdiction over people who in fact are in service, represent vitally
important limits that deserve prompt and effective protection. The
respective Courts of Military Review and the Court of Military Appeals
should not be bashful about using the writs to protect against seeming
disregard of these limits. If I am swimming against the current tide of
decisions in this respect, let me respectfully urge your further consideration.
C. Government Writ Applications

The best is properly saved for last. Writ applications by the government have provoked the greatest judicial concern, at least when the
prospect is viewed from a distance and without distinguishing three quite
distinct variations on the general theme. On closer examination, two of
the three settings in which writs may be sought by the government are
not particularly challenging. Perhaps the least difficulty is presented by
writ applications that arise after conviction, when there is little threat
either to speedy trial or double jeopardy interests. Somewhat greater
difficulty is presented by writ applications filed prior to trial of a case
that remains alive and proceeding toward trial. In these cases, there may
be an interference with the speedy trial interest, but there is little risk to
double jeopardy interests. The most difficult cases arise from applications that are specifically designed to forestall an order that will foreclose
any further prospect of conviction. These cases will be treated last.
The best accepted use of mandamus following conviction has grown up
in cases involving reduction or suspension of sentence. Several cases
have granted mandamus to set aside orders that unlawfully reduced or
suspended sentences previously imposed. Although such orders interfere
with the defendant's sense of repose, it is difficult to believe that double
jeopardy principles prohibit this practice; the ruling in U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 1980, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, that Congress can
validly provide for appeal from a criminal sentence seems to settle the
matter. Mandamus also has issued to set aside denial of a government
motion for resentencing. There should be little difficulty in generalizing
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this practice to other settings, unless they become entangled with discretionary authority that is not subject to a finding of illegality. A
presidential decision to pardon an offender, for example, would hardly be
subject to control by mandamus.
Cases can be found that have used mandamus to set aside the erroneous
grant of a new trial sought by a criminal defendant. Most recent
decisions, however, refuse mandamus. In civil cases, it is clear that there
is at least a very strong presumption against such uses of mandamus; it
seems likely that the same stinginess will be carried over into criminal
cases. Nonetheless, criminal cases present a special problem not encountered in civil cases. Should the defendant be acquitted at the new trial,
there may be a double jeopardy bar against the appellate remedy utilized
in civil cases-appeal from the judgment entered after the new trial, with
reinstatement of the verdict rendered at the first trial. Until it is
established whether there is a double jeopardy bar, there will be a
corresponding role for writ review in truly exigent cases.
Applications for a writ designed to control the course of trial court
proceedings that are continuing toward trial also have been granted.
Some of the issues have involved challenges by the government to a grant
of discovery requested by the defendant, denial of a government request
to depose its own witness for trial purposes, a proposal by the trial judge
that he reveal to the defendant the sentence that would be imposed if a
not guilty plea were changed to a guilty plea, or anticipatory rulings that
would exclude evidence at trial. Mandamus also has been used to set
aside a release on cash bail, and to control the composition of the trial
jury. Cases of this sort present a potential interfere nee with the defendant's interest in a speedy trial. Nonetheless, writ proceedings can be
handled with considerable dispatch in these settings, and the most that
can be said is that the appellate court should consider the need for speed
and its own ability to act quickly, the apparent importance of the issue,
and the probability that error has been committed before deciding to
entertain the writ proceeding.
Writ review presents the greatest temptations and the greatest potential problems when it is sought as a means of controlling trial court action
that is designed to terminate all further proceedings. The problems, of
course, are those of double jeopardy; speedy trial interests are also
implicated, since there is inevitably some delay in getting matters set for
trial, but these interests are in large measure incorporated in the broad
scope of double jeopardy in any event.
The temptations of writ review in this setting are particularly clear in
the setting of a court system that does not provide for appeal by the
government. It is necessary to begin from the premise that simple resort
to a writ form of proceeding cannot evade the double jeopardy constraints
that would attach to an "appeal." Even if you should disagree with the
double jeopardy-appeal concepts that have been adopted by the Supreme
Court-and that is not difficult to d<r-they should be honored. This
lesson is engraved by the ruling in Fong Foo v. U.S., 1962, 369 U.S. 141,
82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629, that mandamus cannot issue to set aside a
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directed verdict of acquittal, no matter how egregiously erroneous the
acquittal may have been.
If double jeopardy would permit a government appeal, however, it also
should permit a writ application. The next step must be to determine
whether the absence of any explicit statutory provision for government
appeal should of itself defeat resort to writ procedure. If there were
clear legislative history that the issue had been confronted and resolved,
perhaps it should be controlling. Absent such history, however, it is
tempting to go further. The temptation is particularly strong unless the
matter of prosecution appeals in military cases has been explicitly reconsidered since 1970. The practice of government appeals in criminal cases
has been transformed since 1970, and a mere failure to provide for such
appeals before 1970 cannot reflect any considered evaluation of the
lessons that have been learned since then. It does not seem at all likely
that there is any legislative history that would distinguish between
government resort to the writs to test pretrial rulings in military cases,
and resort to the writs to control unfounded dismissals. The case for writ
control of pretrial rulings is so strong that by itself it should shape the
approach to be taken to statutory silence.
One additional potential obstacle must be put aside. Once again it
must be determined whether a writ would be in aid of the court's
jurisdiction. This problem has been encountered in an analogous setting
and overcome. On government applications for pretrial writs, it has been
objected that the case might be disposed of on grounds that would
foreclose any government appeal. In this setting, the courts of appeals
have responded that it is sufficient that the case is one that, in other
postures, might come before them. Future jurisdiction need not be
assured in order to support a writ as one issued in aid of jurisdiction.
This argument, however, cannot be applied directly to cases in which the
certain prospect of dismissal by the trial tribunal ensures that appeal is
foreclosed. Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that had the trial tribunal
reached a correct result, the judgment could have been appealed. So long
as double jeopardy does not preclude review, the appellate courts should
have power to protect their jurisdiction against defeat by wrong orders.
This suggestion may seem daring. It is supported, however, by a
number of cases in the federal courts of appeals that arose before the
current government appeal statute. In these cases, mandamus was used
to effect the kinds of review that today would be available by appeal.
Because these cases are so directly relevant to the problems that will
confront the military courts, they are worth noting in some detail.
The earliest of these cases is U.S. v. Igoe, C.A.7th, 1964, 331 F.2d 766,
cert. den. 380 U.S. 942, 85 S.Ct. 1020, 13 L.Ed.2d 961. The district court
erroneously accepted a waiver of jury trial by the defendant without the
government's consent, and then dismissed the case upon the government's
refusal to proceed with trial to the court. Mandamus issued to set aside
the dismissal. This course is fully consistent with current appeal doctrine.
The next case was U.S. v. Dooling, 2d Cir.1969, 406 F.2d 192, cert. den.
395 U.S. 911, 89 S.Ct. 1744, 23 L.Ed.2d 224. The defendants were
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convicted at the fourth trial held to prove their guilt; the convictions
were reversed, and a fifth trial was held. The defendants were again
convicted. The district judge, Judge Dooling, indicated that he intended
to enter an order dismissing the indictment solely because of delay
between the reversal of the convictions at the fourth trial and the
institution of the fifth trial. He suggested that government counsel find
some way to frame the order so that appellate review would be possible.
Instead, a petition for mandamus was filed before the order was entered;
the writ was granted, pursuant to the court's supervisory power and its
responsibility "for preventing gross disruption in the administration of
criminal justice."
A third case is U.S. v. Weinstein, 2d Cir.1971, 452 F.2d 704, cert. den.
406 U.S. 917, 92 S.Ct. 1766, 32 L.Ed.2d 116. Judge Weinstein was
convinced that the jury had erred in convicting the defendant, but that
there was no particularly good reason for a new trial. Accordingly, in an
effort to make review possible he first entered a judgment of conviction,
and then entered an order setting aside the conviction. Mandamus issued
to set aside the dismissal, on the ground that he had acted beyond his
"jurisdiction" and in the interests of the sound administration of criminal
justice.
A final case is U.S. v. Lasker, 2d Cir.1973, 481 F.2d 229, cert. den. 415
U.S. 975, 94 S.Ct. 1560, 39 L.Ed.2d 871. Judge Lasker dismissed the
indictments in that case for failure to proceed promptly to trial. Mandamus again issued, drawing from the court's power to prevent potential
disruption of the orderly administration of justice.

It must be observed that in all of the cases from the Second Circuit, the
trial judge was anxious to cooperate in achieving appellate review. This
cooperation was manifested by actions that made it possible to achieve
review within the limits of currently received double jeopardy doctrine.
So long as trial courts are willing to provide such assistance, there is a
particularly strong reason to permit use of the extraordinary writs.
Appellate review can be helpful to trial judges who are uncertain of the
law; as a cooperative endeavor in which all judges seek alike to conform
to the law, it is an aid rather than an intrusion.
If trial judges are anxious to defeat writ review, however, matters will
be much more difficult. No more need be done than to frame the
judgment as a fact-based acquittal; no matter how erroneous it may be,
indeed no matter how transparent the errors of law that may infect the
acquittal, double jeopardy principles apparently preclude review [Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43; Fong Foo].

Within the limits of double jeopardy, then, it may be possible to do
much to provide appellate review in the most pressing cases, even after a
final disposition by the trial court. If the federal courts of appeals could
do it before enlargement of the criminal appeals statute, the military
courts can do it now.
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CONCLUSION
No more than a few words are needed by way of conclusion. The
central point was stated at the outset. The extraordinary writs have
become appeals writs in the federal courts of appeals. There is every
reason to expect that the process will continue to evolve, until it becomes
an appeal process in form as well as fact. Military courts can experiment
with expanding the writs in similar fashion. The similarities, however,
are not perfect. The appeals rules and relationships that make best sense
for civilian courts need not make the best sense for military courts. You
will be able to forge strong and good answers for yourselves, but you
must take time in doing it. Experience will teach you the proper
relationships, and how to change the relationships as your institutional
framework continues to evolve. Do not worry about finding the ideal
answer; you never will find it, and cannot adhere to it for long even if
you should stumble upon it for a while. You can do no more than to
respond to your own needs as best you can understand them. I am
confident that you will do that, and wish you a good outcome.

